What *is* Virtue Ethics?

This question is raised and discussed in Marcia Baron's chapter "Virtue ethics in relation to Kantian ethics" (see book in last post). The question is important as we try to set out virtue ethics as either part of or distinct from deontology and/or consequentialism (or its sub-theory, utilitarianism).

A plausible answer offered comes from Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View:

In virtue ethics, the notion of virtue is central in the sense that conceptions of
rightness, conceptions of the good life, conceptions of “the moral point of view”
and the appropriate demandingness of morality, cannot be understood without
a conception of relevant virtues. (Swanton 2003: 5) (quoted on Baron, p.28)

The question naturally arises: can Buddhist ethics be a form of virtue ethics by this definition? Even the arguably later (Mahayana) twin virtues of wisdom and compassion are not the foundations around all else revolves in Buddhist ethical thought.

Rather, I think, the dhamma (or law) is the foundation and the "moral point of view" around which all else turns. This is why various sets of virtues have arisen in Buddhist history; all of which aim at attuning the practitioner to the dhamma. 

Defending contemporary moral theories from feminist critiques

In Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian and Virtue Ethics, Marcia Baron offers an intriguing introductory essay discussing the history of dispute between virtue ethics and Kantian ethics (much of this dispute, she notes, is also from virtue ethicists and aimed at all of 'Modern philosophy'). Some disagreement also comes from the realm of feminist philosophy, which she suggests is likely to be misguided.

She writes that "much of what contemporary ethics was faulted for neglecting was, according to the traditional gendered division of labor and of character traits, located under the heading of “feminine.” Rather than diminishing the importance of reason in our conceptions of ethics, Baron suggests:

The problem seems more centrally to be that (a) women have been assumed to be deficient in reason and excessively emotional and (b) it has further been assumed that any such deficiencies reflect inherent differences between the sexes. (p.13)

Quoting J.S. Mill, she suggests that it is not the case that women are less rational and thus 'left out' of contemporary ethical theory unfairly, bur rather that women have simply been oppressed by patriarchal societies.

At the same time, "qualities traditionally associated with women" such as nurturing or caring deserve greater attention in our reflections on morality (p.14).

Becoming a Dhamma teacher, some guidance

"It's not easy to teach the Dhamma to others, Ananda. The Dhamma should be taught to others only when five qualities are established within the person teaching. Which five?

"[1] The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak step-by-step.'
"[2] The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak explaining the sequence [of cause & effect].'
"[3] The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak out of compassion.'
"[4] The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak not for the purpose of material reward.'
"[5] The Dhamma should be taught with the thought, 'I will speak without hurting myself or others.' 

-AN 5.159

Bhikkhu Bodhi's essay on non-dualism and the Buddha's pragmatic philosophy

Dhamma and Non-duality

In contrast to the non-dualistic systems, the Buddha's approach does not aim at the discovery of a unifying principle behind or beneath our experience of the world. Instead it takes the concrete fact of living experience, with all its buzzing confusion of contrasts and tensions, as its starting point and framework, within which it attempts to diagnose the central problem at the core of human existence and to offer a way to its solution. Hence the polestar of the Buddhist path is not a final unity but the extinction of suffering, which brings the resolution of the existential dilemma at its most fundamental level.

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_27.html

Aristotle's "Anger"

I was surprised today to read Aristotle's account of anger, in the Nichomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chapter 7:

In what concerns anger too there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean;
and although these are pretty much nameless, let us call the mean gentle-
ness, since we speak of the person in the middle as  gentle.  Of those at
the extremes, let he who is excessive be irascible, the vice irascibility, and
let he who is  deficient be a sort of "unirascible" person, the deficiency
"unirascibility." 

That "gentleness" is the mean of "anger" is quite contradictory by our contemporary definitions, is it not?

Certainly I recall reading (I believe in The Art of Happiness) that the Dalai Lama claimed that emotions such as anger and hatred are at the core of violence; thus placing anger in the category of irredeemably negative emotions.

However, it seems that what Aristotle must be talking about here is not anger as we tend to think of it, but rather a sort of 'concern' which can be, in excess hot-tempered and in deficiency apathetic.

We are helped in this change of terminology in the translator's definition of thumos:

SPIRIT, SPIRITEDNESS (thumos): The seat of anger andof"natural courage"; it is also translated as "heart" in the quotation from Hesiod in book  I  (1095 b13). (p.315)

 Aristotle goes on in Book 4, chapter 5:

The person who gets angry at the things and with whom he ought, then, and, further, in the way, when, and for as much time as he ought, is praised. Hence this person would be gentle, if indeed gentleness is praised. The gentle person wishes to be calm and not led by his passion, but rather  as reason may command, and so to be harsh regarding the things he ought and for the requisite time.

...

For those who do not get angry at the things they ought are held to be foolish, as are those who do not get angry in the way they ought or when or with whom they ought. For such a person seems to lack perception and even not to feel pain; since he does not get angry, he seems not apt to defend himself against an attack. Yet to hold back in this way after having been treated insolently, and to overlook such treatment of one's kin, is held to be slavish. 

The wikipedia page on the topic gives us:

Concerned with	Mean	Excess	Deficiency
anger (orgē)	Gentleness (praotēs)	Irascibility (Rackham), Irritability (Sachs) (orgilotēs)	Spiritlessness (aorgẽs

Just some thoughts.

Deontology in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

For simplicity, hard lines are often drawn between Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, as ideal exemplars of virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. However, whenever we look more closely, we will find a mixture of these 'systems' of ethics in each thinker. Or at least we can, depending on how we define our terms.

I have before me the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, which on pp.200-201 defines deontological ethics. It begins:

1. According to deontology, certain acts are right or wrong in themselves. ... Note that deontology is not the same as absolutism, according to which certain acts are wrong whatever the consequences. 

The second part of this will be addressed later. But the first part, that certain acts are right or wrong in themselves can be found almost verbatim in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chapter 6, where Aristotle discusses virtues in terms of means between extremes:

But not every action or every passion admits of the mean, for some have names that are immediately associated with baseness-for example, spitefulness, shamelessness, envy, and, when it comes to actions, adultery, theft, and murder. For all these things, and those like them, are spoken of as being themselves base, rather than just their excesses or deficiencies. It is never possible, then, to be correct as regards them, but one is always in error; and it is not possible to do what concerns such things well or not well-by committing adultery with the woman one ought and when and as one ought. Rather, doing any of these things whatever is simply in error. 

 I think we can take "in error" to mean the same thing as "wrong". 

Must all 'Philosophy' include metaphysics?

Such is the assertion at the outset of T.K. Abbott's translation of Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals, Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), translated by Abbott as The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics:

If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a
system of rational knowledge based on concepts), then
there must also be for this philosophy a system of pure
rational concepts, independent of any condition of in-
tuition, in other words, a metaphysic.

He goes on:

It may be asked
whether metaphysical elements are  required also for
every practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of du-
ties, and therefore also for Ethics, in order to be able to
present it as a true science (systematically), not merely
as  an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily). 

So are metaphyics (or a metaphysical edifice) necessary for ethics? Only, perhaps, if that ethics is to be presented systematically rather than fragmentarily (a key difference between Kant and the Buddha's teachings, perhaps).

As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question
this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal
in the elective will, which has to be limited in its exter-
nal relations according to laws of freedom; without re-
garding any end which is the matter of this will.  

I'm not sure what exactly to make of this sentence. For 'pure jurisprudence', I take it to mean abstract reasoning on the good, in itself, free from particular instances. 'Without regarding any end...' I take to mean without any particular goal in mind, again trying to understand 'the good' in an abstract form. If 'the good' is to be understood on par with matter or mathematics, it must be examined in the most abstract manner possible. And so, Abbott continues:

Here, therefore, deontology is a mere scientific doctrine (doc-
trina scientiae).

Abbott goes on to make a distinction similar to Kant's own in the Groundwork, namely that our reasoning about ethics must begin with the concept of duty in its most abstract form, not from feelings, either the quest for maximizing happiness or avoiding suffering (again a distinction from Buddhism, which begins and ends with suffering). If we are to do this, we ally ourselves with 'feeling by whatever it may be excited' and thus endless possibilities in the empirical realm.

For instance a greedy drug-maker who stumbles upon a miracle drug that saves millions and accidentally releases its patent (and thus earns nothing) might be hailed as a hero as great as Jonas Salk (who did the same but purposely didn't patent the polio vaccine). The consequences of each man's work might be the same, but only one acted according to a sense of duty toward humankind. Thus, for Kant and his followers, only one acted morally.

Abbott then reiterates Kant's understanding of how morality leads to happiness, namely that a 'thinking man' conquers the temptations of vice and is conscious of having come to act according to duty, and 'finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is her own reward' (p.10). The happiness-seeker, on the other hand, argues that this happiness was the motive all along and our thinking man merely acts out of duty for the sake of that happiness.

[Now, this may look conspicuously like Buddhism, but I'd argue the opposite. The Buddhist practitioner might start with a quest to just overcome his/her own suffering, but this morphs over time with the realization of interconnectedness, etc, toward a recognition of the need to help all beings, thus abandoning a merely selfish goal and taking up a sense of duty to be of service. It is this shift from a selfish goal toward a universal one that marks a stream-enterer; or something like that. I need to gather sources and justifications, but the point is that the Buddhist 'thinking man' who has conquered vice and done his duty and feels peace and satisfaction will have done so out of an attraction to goodness (kusala) itself in the end.]

In any case, if the Buddhist practitioner merely seeks after whatever appears to remove suffering, he will no doubt chase after a million chimerical solutions, running this way and that. It is only with a firm grasp on certain realizations (or acceptances) about the nature of reality can he/she move forward in a straight line in life. Obeying duty (Dhamma) often means abandoning one's search for the latest happiness-producing-activity. And this is the key point. If one's allegiance is toward happiness, one will not abide by duty, which often requires suffering, temporary as it may be.

Thus the need for this metaphysical distinction between ultimate aims. As Abbott concludes:

If this distinction is not observed; if eudaemonism
(the principle of happiness) is adopted as the principle
instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of
the inner legislation), the consequence is the euthana-
sia (quiet death) of all morality. (p.11)

So we have begun with a call to the need for metaphysics and ended with that metaphysics differentiating two key directions that moral philosophers might take: one toward physiology and joys/sorrows as its justification, and one toward a transcendent, unknowable (but feelable) duty or dharma. 

Kantian Subject vs Nibbana

(after discussing the 'conditioned' world...)

Nibbana, by contrast, is depicted as the allaying of differentiation. For example, while in AN IV. 174 Sariputta spoke of that beyond the six sense-contacts as ‘non-complication’ he says in the previous sutta:

However far the six spheres of contact go, that is how far differentiation goes. However far differentiation goes, that is how far the six spheres of contact go. With the remainderless fading and stopping of the six spheres of contact, there comes to be the stopping, the allaying of differentiation.
(AN IV. 173) 

Insofar  as  it  is  unconditioned  by  qualities  pertaining  to  the  six  spheres  of contact, nibbana seems notably parallel to Kant’s (1787, A404) ‘noumenal subject’, namely, as ‘not a real whole but a simple’. I interpret Kant to mean here that the noumenal subject, as a simple, is undifferentiated by any empirical or conceptual determination. But while Kant believes the deliveries of sense and reason to exhaust the scope of human knowledge and experience (perhaps rendering the noumenal self to be little more than logical abstraction) this does not seem to be true with respect to nibbana. The idea that nibbana, beyond the differentiated sense-realm, can be directly experienced and understood – (and as I have argued, not as a separate object of experience) – sets it apart from Kant’s humanly unknowable noumenal subject:

Therefore  Bhikkhus,  that  base  should  be  understood,  where  the  eye ceases and perception of forms fades away. That base should be understood, where the ear ceases and perception of sounds fades away ... That base  should  be  understood  where  the  mind  ceases  and  perception  of mental phenomena fades away. That base should be understood.
(SN XXXV. 117)

Miri Albahari, Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of Self 2006, p. 41

Kant on Virtue (or character)

The human being who is conscious of having character in his way of thinking does not have it by nature; he must always have acquired it. One may also assume that the grounding of character is like a kind of rebirth, a certain solemnity of making a vow to oneself; which makes the resolution and the moment when this transformation took place unforgettable to him/ like the beginning of a new epoch. - Education, examples, and teaching generally cannot bring about this firmness and persistence in principles gradually, but only, as it were, by an explosion which happens one time as a result of weariness at the unstable condition of instinct. Perhaps there are only a few who have attempted this revolution before the age of thirty, and fewer still who have firmly established it before they are forty. - Wanting to become a better human being in a fragmentary way is a futile endeavor, since one impression dies out while one works on another; the grounding of character, however, is absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct as such. - It is also said that poets have no character, for example, they would rather insult their best friends than give up a witty inspiration; or that character is not to be sought at all among courtiers, who must put up with all fashions; 6 and that with clergymen, who court the Lord of Heaven as well as the lords of the earth in one and the same pitch/firmness of character is in a troublesome condition; and, accordingly, it probably is and will remain only a pious wish that they have inner (moral)* character. But perhaps the philosophers are to blame for this, because they have never yet isolated this concept and placed it in a sufficiently bright light, and have sought to present virtue only in fragments but have never tried to present it whole, in its beautiful form, and to make it interesting for all human beings.

from Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View in Anthropology, History, and Education (p.392)

Why Philosophy: From Bertrand Russell

If we are not to fail in our endeavour to determine the value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudices of what are wrongly called “practical" men. The “practical man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but Is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time. 

. . . Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), selections from Chapters 1, 14, and 15.

Why Philosophy: from The Mansions of Philosophy

The busy reader will ask, is all this philosophy useful? It Is a shameful question: We do not ask it of poetry, which is also an imaginative construction of world incompletely known. If poetry reveals to us the beauty our untaught eyes have missed, and philosophy gives us the wisdom to understand and forgive, it is enough, and more than the world’s wealth. Philosophy will not fatten our purses, nor lift us to dizzy dignities in a democratic state; it may even make us a little careless of these things. For what if we should fatten our purses, or rise to high office, and yet all the while remain ignorantly naive, coarsely unfurnished in the mind, brutal in behavior, unstable in character, chaotic in desire, and blindly miserable?

... Perhaps philosophy will give us, if we are faithful to it, a healing unity of soul. We are so slovenly and self- contradictory in our thinking; it may be that we shall clarify ourselves, and pull ourselves together into  consistency, and be ashamed to harbor contradictory desires or beliefs. And through unity of mind may come  that unity of purpose and character which makes a personality, and lends some order and dignity to our existence. 

Will Durant The Mansions of Philosophy, 1929  p.x

Sarcasm in the Pali Canon

From DN 3 (pp.122-3 in Walsh):


‘And was the Reverend Gotama such [107] as he is reported
to be, and not otherwise? And is he of such nature, and not
otherwise?’ ‘Sir, he is as he is reported to be. and he is of such
nature and not otherwise. He is possessed of the thirty-two
marks of a Great Man, all complete, with none missing.’
‘But was there any conversation between you and the asce-
tic Gotama?' ‘There was, sir.’
‘And what was this conversation about?’ So Ambattha told
Pokkharasati all that had passed between the Lord and him-
self.



2.15. At this Pokkharasati exclaimed: ‘Well, you're a fine
little scholar, a fine wise man, a fine expert in the Three
Vedas! Anyone going about his business like that ought when
he dies, at the breaking-up of the body, to go to the downfall,
to the evil path, to ruin, to hell! You have heaped insults on
the Reverend Gotama, as a result of which he has brought up
more and more things against us! You’re a fine little scholar
. . .l' He was so angry and enraged that he kicked Ambattha
over, and wanted to start out at once to see the Lord. [108]

Where to find me these days

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/americanbuddhist/

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Buddhism Entries

Vasubandhu
Jonathan C. Gold
Gorampa [go rams pa]
Constance Kassor

Śāntarakṣita
James Blumenthal

Madhyamaka
Richard Hayes

Ethics in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism
Charles Goodman

Tibetan Epistemology and Philosophy of Language
Pascale Hugon

The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet
Sonam Thakchoe

Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy
Christian Coseru

Nāgārjuna
Jan Westerhoff

The Theory of Two Truths in India
Sonam Thakchoe

Language and Testimony in Classical Indian Philosophy
Madhav Deshpande

Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy
Brendan Gillon

Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy
Stephen Phillips

Kumārila
Daniel Arnold

Abhidharma
Noa Ronkin

Buddha
Mark Siderits

The Concept of Emotion in Classical Indian Philosophy
Joerg Tuske

Analytic Philosophy in Early Modern India
Jonardon Ganeri

Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy
Monima Chadha


* Via Jan Westerhoff on H-Buddhism

Kant and the right to Lie

Kant's ethics surrounding truth and lies is quite complex, even though it is often taught with the simplistic example: if a murderer comes to your house and asks you where his desired victim is; and you're hiding that victim, Kant says it's wrong to lie. Ergo, according to Kant, you must tell the murderer where the person is. This example is at best horribly misleading. Here is an excerpt where Kant explains just such an example:

"I  can also, however, commit a falsiloquium, when my intent is to hide
my intentions from the other, and he can also presume that I shall do so,
since his own purpose is to make a wrongful use of the truth. If an enemy,
for  example, takes me by the throat and demands to know where my
money is kept, I can hide the information here, since he means to misuse
the  truth. That is still  no mendacium for the other knows that I shall
withhold  the  information,  and  that he  also  has no right whatever to de-
mand the truth from me...  

Not every untruth is a lie; it is so only if there is an express declaration of my willingness to inform the other of my thought. Every lie is objectionable and deserving of contempt, for once we declare that we are telling the other our thoughts..."

 From his Lectures on Ethics, p.203

[INDOLOGY] Summer courses in Oxford

A wonderful opportunity for those in/around England this summer. I would definitely attend if I could. Next year...

The Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies and the Society for the Wider

Understanding of the Buddhist Tradition are offering two free courses

in Oxford this summer.

1. Pali Summer School. The Society for the Wider Understanding of the

Buddhist Tradition (So-Wide) offers an intensive Pali course this

summer, 14-26 August inclusive.

Aim. At the end of the course you should be able, using the normal

aids available, i.e. dictionaries, grammars and translations, slowly

to read a Pali canonical text and understand it for yourself.

Is this really possible? I devised the course and have already given

it five times with great success. Pali can be learnt in twelve days

because the aim is only to read it, not to write or speak it – though

you do learn to pronounce it and recite a few chants. There is also

much less emphasis on memorisation than in a traditional course: why

memorise things you can easily look up?

Method. Accordingly, the course is built on learning how to use the

Pali-English Dictionary published by the Pali Text Society (www.palitext.com

). The course begins with learning Pali alphabetical order (it is a

good idea to start on this before arriving) and throughout the course

each pupil is constantly using the Dictionary. Tables of the main

grammatical forms are supplied and, again, students constantly consult

them for themselves, until they become familiar.

You are strongly encouraged to buy your own copy of the Dictionary.

If you live overseas and do not want to carry it to Oxford, you may

ask the Pali Text Society, when you buy it, to post it to you at the

OCBS Office (address below).

Students and teachers sit round a table together

throughout the course. Students are urged to keep asking questions,

and to work in cooperation.

Organisation. The first day, 14 August, is in a sense preliminary.

Mr. Geoffrey Bamford will explain the grammatical terms and principles

you need to understand for the course. Experience has shown us that

unless you have already studied Latin, Greek or Sanskrit you

definitely should attend.

The rest of the course is extremely intensive. It is

cumulative, so that to miss an early lesson is disastrous. The one

rigid rule is that no one may miss a class in the first week. We

shall work out the precise timetable when we meet, but the general

pattern will be that there will be classes each day from 9.30 to 5.30,

with a long lunch break. There will be homework every evening.

The course will end at mid-day on Thursday 26th; I hope

we can then all lunch together.

Content. We shall start to read original texts from the first

Monday. I shall be open to suggestions about texts to read. Besides

the Pali language, the course will discuss the Pali canon and many

questions concerning the Buddha’s teaching and our evidence for it.

Practical Arrangements. The course will take place at the main

(Headington) campus of Oxford Brookes University. Students who do not

live locally will be housed in single rooms in Clive Booth Hall

(formerly Morrell Hall), which is ten minutes easy walk from the main

campus on the Gipsy Lane site, where the classes will be held 

(http://www.brookes.ac.uk/studying/accommodation/halls/clivebooth

). I am afraid that normally there is no parking available.

There are cooking facilities at Clive Booth Hall, at no extra charge.

There are bar and cafeteria facilities, including breakfast, on the

Gipsy Lane site, except on Sundays, and we shall ourselves maintain a

supply of tea and coffee in the lecture room. The charge for the

bedroom is £25.00 per night, payable in advance for the whole course.

My tuition and course materials are provided free, but we

have to pay for some teaching assistance, the lecture room and some

other expenses. We are therefore charging each student £150.00.

Since this sum will not entirely cover our expenses, any further

donation will be very welcome.

Booking. Please apply to me, Richard Gombrich, at 

Richard.gombrich@balliol.ox.ac.uk

, asap. When applying, please supply full contact details, including

telephone, and let me know your highest educational qualification. We

also need to know whether you require accommodation, and if so whether

you want it for the night of Friday 13 August. The closing date for

applications is 14 July and by that date we require payment in

advance. Normally that would be £325 for accommodation (if you are

staying the first Friday night) + £150 fee, total: £475.00. If you

feel you can afford to make that up to or towards £1,000, so much the

better. Please send a sterling cheque payable to the Society for the

Wider Understanding of the Buddhist Tradition. I am afraid it is too

expensive for us to accept payment in a foreign currency. Please

address your payment to OCBS Office attention Hazel Benyon, Wolfson

College, Linton Road, Oxford OX2 6UD.

Admittance will be first come, first served. No more than 14 will

be admitted, so hurry to book a place.

Bookings should be made through me, and all inquiries addressed to me.

Richard Gombrich (Richard.gombrich@balliol.ox.ac.uk)

Enlightened View, from Charles Goodman

I'm working my way through Charles Goodman's excellent Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics, and finding gem after gem of clarity and wisdom.

That might be surprising considering I'm a Kantian (a la Wood) studying under a Virtue ethicist (Keown) and Goodman is a sturdy defender of Consequentialism. It just goes to show that wisdom can work its way around our silly (at times) categories of things.

Today I just wanted to share his brief statement on enlightened ethics:

.... enlightened beings act fully spontaneously, out of innate great compassion, without having to engage in practical reasoning. (p.125)

If asked though, such beings could quickly explain their actions based on the Buddhist scheme of their choosing (be it Kantian, Virtue based, or Consequentialist...).

A Comparative Study of Early Buddhism and Kantian Philosophy - reviewed

Originally posted at American Buddhist Perspective here and here.

A comparative study of early Buddhism and Kantian philosophy by S.G.M. Weerasinghe

This is essentially the topic of my doctoral thesis, and here it is, all in 88 pages plus a glossary and index. Sadly though, I can't really recommend the book. Even though it's short (usually a plus in my world) and covers topics quite dear to my heart, it also has more than its share of flaws. To start, it's written from something of a Buddhist triumphalist standpoint. Statements like "Early Buddhist philosophy is a royal highway for all those who wish to attain the summum bonum. the ideal of human life. It is a remarkable religio-philosophy complete in every respect" (p.11) are nice, but they're a clear sign that scholarly objectivity (an ideal, never actualized) is not going to be present.

On the other hand, the suggestion that "The perfection of morality cannot be achieved without an innumerable number of rebirths (in saṃsāra). Thus the idea of rebirth is implied in Kantianism" (p.9) also shows a total lack of sensitivity to the context of Kant's writing. Particularly appalling is the claim, a few pages later that Kant's "kingdom of ends" is a "fairy tale" from a Buddhist point of view. The Kingdom of Ends is for Kant a sort of heavenly ideal - not a blissed-out happy-go-lucky heaven, but simply one in which all beings treat each other out of respect, i.e. all beings act fully morally.

There are many commendable points though. 

The comparison of Kant's antinomies (pairs of opposing propositions that both cannot be true but could not be proved either way) and the Buddha's silence on certain metaphysical questions is helpful and informative. In Kant's works these include the propositions that

1. the world is infinite or finite, 
2. all composite things are made up of simple parts, or there are no simple parts,
3. free-will or determinism is true, and 
4. there is or is not a necessary being (God).

Discussing Kant's response, Weerasinghe writes:

Kant shows that both thesis and antithesis in the above ‘four pairs’ can equally be supported with a (seemingly) valid proof (CPR., A 426 B 454 - A 463 B 491). Therefore he concludes that they are all pseudo-rational assertions (Ger. vernünftelnde Behauptungen) appearing to rest on an empty concept (Ger. einen leeren Begriff ) (CPR., A 494 B 518). In other words Kant implies that they are all wrong propositions (i.e. judgements) originated from a wrong assumption (i.e. the concept of the world) based on the category of totality (CPR., A 426 B 454 - A 428 B 456) and consequently are having no validity in themselves. (p.31)

This sounds much like the analyses of Buddha's response to the wanderer Vacchagotta  in The Grouped Sayings by the Buddha. Samyutta Nikāya. Book III 257-263 The Vacchagotta section 33. Thread on Not Knowing: Aññānā Sutta (1-55). As he points out, Vacchagotta posed similar questions to the Buddha out of "curiosity without any ethical aim" (p.33).


The chapter comparing the Epistemology (theory of knowledge) of Kant and the Buddha also furthers the Kant-bashing and Buddha-loving of previous chapters, while not failing to point out some central ideas of each. 

Thus our empirical knowledge, according to Kant, is a reconstruction of what we experience in our daily life. In other words, it is a distortion of the true picture of the external world or, for that matter, anything which is experienced as knowledge. (p.41)

This is well-compared to the Buddha's concept of ignorance (avijjā) giving rise to our perception of the world of compound objects. To see without ignorance is to see the voidness of all things.

I'll stop there for tonight. Tomorrow I'll finish up with the Epistemology and the largest chapter, Ethics. Then, maybe, I'll get back to Buddhism, Brain, and Mind, a thought-stream I started over a week ago and left hanging. Oh, and then there are some Buddha-barn pics to post... Should be a fun Monday. :)

Part 2:

A comparative study of early Buddhism and Kantian philosophy by S.G.M. Weerasingh

One of the first things that drew me both to Kantian and Buddhist ethics was the notion of a morality that is at once transcendent and imminent. This means that there is a sense in which morality lies beyond our normal conceptions of the world and yet it is accessible to us always. In Buddhism it is beyond our normal conceptions because of egoic ignorance, fed by our clinging to pleasures and pushing away of negative feelings. Insofar as we are unenlightened, we all do this. Moments of awareness help break the habit-cycle.

In Kant's works we are dominated by heteronomy - other (hetero) laws (nomos). To be ruled by heteronomy is to be subservient, subservient to our desires for power, addictions, and even moral and political rules set down by others. It is by employment of reason that we begin to untangle ourselves from these laws - choosing those we follow instead of blindly following.

But hitherto I have seen little or no mention of the Pāli term papañca (Skt. prapañca), explained by Weerasinghe here in relation to Kant's use of 'phenomena':

The Kantian concept of phenomena immediately reminds us at the doctrine olpapa4ca in early Buddhism The word papañca (Skt. prapañca) derived from pra+√pañc, to spread out, conveys the sense of expansion, diffuseness and manifoldness (cf: PTS., Dic. q.v.). In doctrinal use it signifies expansion, diffuseness or manifoldness of the world we perceive with our senses. It may also refer to the ‘phenomenal world’ in general, and to the ‘mental attitude of worldliness.’ (p.48)

Keown's Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism (Danny Fisher informed me in January that "there's an App for that" - you can download the whole thing to your iPhone/iPod) has no entry for papañca but does have prapañca on page 220: "Term meaning 'proliferation', in the sense of the multiplication of erroneous concepts, ideas, and ideologies which obscure the true nature of reality...." NYANATILOKA MAHATHERA's great Buddhist Dictionary has a more detailed explanation, including references here:

Dhp. 254: "Mankind delights in the diffuseness of the world, the Perfect Ones are free from such diffuseness"(papañcābhiratā pajā, nippapañca tathāgatā). - The 8th of the 'thoughts of a great man' (mahā-purisa-vitakka; A. VIII, 30) has: "This Dhamma is for one who delights in non-diffuseness (the unworldly, Nibbāna); it is not for him who delights in worldliness (papañca).

So in Buddhism papañca appears to have a clearly negative flavor not found in Kant's understanding of phenomena, which in Caygill's Kant Dictionary is given a much more nuanced treatment than either Weerasinghe or I have presented. But they are similar in suggesting a 'this-world' (understanding) and a transcendent understanding - one which is fully in the flow/flux of reality free from conceptual proliferation.

ETHICS

The opening assertion that the:

Buddhist revolution in ethics consists of the discovery that "one is responsible for ones deeds (kamma)". That is that one is the cause of ones predicament. Hence one is the creator of oneself. So the solution to the problem of suffering is within oneself and not in the hands of a supposed creator-God. (p.58)

does indeed seem to resonate well with the teaching of Early Buddhism (later forms of Buddhism rely on the logic of not-self to move away from this teaching somewhat).  Weerasinghe is unfortunately caught up by Kant's insistence in a belief in God even more than usual in this section. For Kant, God is simply the agent necessary for ensuring that deeds do have moral consequences, i.e. that good ultimately comes to those who are good and vice versa.  It is quite different from karma but it serves much the same role in moral thinking. After ranting on about this for a couple pages, we find this conclusion:

Thus we may notice that the Kantian view of ethics is not consistent and systematic in comparison to the moral philosophy of early Buddhism which is consistent, systematic and founded on an ethico-psychological basis. (p.61)

In fact most modern scholars would say the opposite, that Kant is systematic and Early Buddhism is somewhat lacking in clarity (though clearly filled with various 'moral' teachings). Back to Early Buddhism, we find:

(i) Morality needs no religion to support it. (ii) This idea is well established in EB. which maintains that dhamma or morality is something independent and is discovered by the Buddhas from epoch to epoch. (iii) Morality in EB. [is] atheistic to the core has nothing to do with any divine being. (p.62)

And likewise in both Kant and Buddhism is found a teaching of morality as a discovery (not an invention, social norm, revelation, etc.). "According to Buddhism morality means, inter alia, to live in accordance with what is implicit in the nature of things" (p.64).

While Weerasinghe goes on to be overly harsh on Kant (and outright wrong in too many places to address) and praising of early Buddhism, his criticism that Kant is missing the applied aspect of ethics seems fair (cf. p.70). Kant was at the same time perhaps too confident in humanities ability to use reason to evaluate motivations and break free from superstition and manipulation, as well as pessimistic that one could ever truly do this in this lifetime.

But beyond this, Weerasinghe's accusations and confusions only continue - for instance lambasting Kant for his thoughts on human evil (suggesting that Kant painted a "pathetic picture of man"(p.65)), and praising him for his philosophy of the Good will, which is by it's own nature good as "a great teaching apparently unknown to, and unheard of in the then Western philosophy" (p. 77). One assertion, which would be merely amusing if it weren't in a supposedly academic text is that those aspects of Kant that are good and useful are "not European, but Indian in spirit" (pp. 85-86 emphasis in original). Sigh.

As I suggested in my last post, it's a hard book to recommend. The book didn't make any real splash in the Western academic world, so even academics seem to have ignored it. It has a fair number of typos, is not terribly easy to get ahold of, and sadly hacks up Kantian philosophy.  Between the last comment I quoted and the one starting the book in my last post, "Early Buddhist philosophy is a royal highway..." you should have a pretty good idea of what to expect.

Selected Q & A from the Comments:

From Tom:

Speaking of "kingdom of ends," the local library here tells me "Creating a Kingdom of Ends" is ready for me to pick up. I ordered the book based on a post in one of your other blogs from 2 1/2 years ago that reread a handfull of days ago.

Kind Mr. Whitaker, since you are more of a Kantian than Mr/Ms Weerasinghe, can you give me your response [on behalf of Buddhism] to the "kingdom of ends?"

Justin:

Great book, Tom - let me know what you think of it. If I understand your question correctly, you'd like me to give a Buddhist version of the Kingdom of ends. Such a kingdom would simply be the end result of the Bodhisattva's vow - where all beings are awakened from suffering and ignorance. Is this technically possible? Not really in any of our lifetimes - so some could call it an empty wish. But it's an ideal we do well to strive for, in this lifetime and, if there are more, in those as well.

Tom:

OK. I know I stupid as dirt, but put up with me for a moment.

Can you expound on this: "For Kant, God is simply the agent necessary for ensuring that deeds do have moral consequences, i.e. that good ultimately comes to those who are good and vice versa."

How does Kant perceive God!? A guy-like superbeing on a cloud with an intense aversion to sin? How does this agency function? Are gears or computers a part of God?

Worldliness is "diffuse," you say. I am trying to understand the sense in which that is so, employing my probably-diffuse mind. A good mind, then, is more focussed? Attentive? Won't have typos in his book?

Justin:

Oh much wiser than dirt, Tom: "How does Kant perceive God!?"

That's just it. He doesn't perceive God at all, for God (like morality) lies on the other half of the noumenal/phenomenal divide from perception. God is just an "idea" of perfection that we *need* to believe in in order to do the often hard work of being moral. In that sense he's more like the Buddha (as a perfectly awakened being, not just a great teacher) than he is like the action of karma.

A good mind, I think, is focused, and able to balance both the manifold world (conventional reality) and the world of flux and no-self-natureness (ultimate reality). 

Dhammapada: life is hard

244-245(accesstoinsight)

Life's easy to live for someone unscrupulous, cunning as a crow, corrupt, back-biting, forward, & brash; but for someone who's constantly scrupulous, cautious, observant, sincere, pure in his livelihood, clean in his pursuits, it's hard.

Dhamma as indispensible

The following from Bhikkhu Bodhi appears to present an argument against Aristotelianism or reducing or getting rid of cosmology/metaphysics:

The importance of this directly visible side of Dhamma practice cannot be underestimated, as it serves to confirm our confidence in the liberating efficacy of the Buddhist path. However, to downplay the doctrine of rebirth and explain the entire import of the Dhamma as the amelioration of mental suffering through enhanced self-awareness is to deprive the Dhamma of those wider perspectives from which it derives its full breadth and profundity. By doing so one seriously risks reducing it in the end to little more than a sophisticated ancient system of humanistic psychotherapy. - http://www.vipassana.org/resources/bodhi/dhamma_without_rebirth.php (emphasis mine)

Buddhist Publication Society Newsletter cover essay #6 (Spring 1987)
Copyright © 1987 Buddhist Publication Society

If we incorporate this into our understanding of Buddhist ethics, it means we must object (at least in par) to Damien Keown's (1992/2001) focus on the goal of nirvana "in this lifetime." Of course he does this to maintain a focus on a robust moral agent and avoid issues of rebirth and the moral nature of an awakened one. He does address both of these but seeks to keep the focus on moral conduct, sīla.

But arguments such as Bhikkhu Bodhi's above, and others, suggest that we broaden the discussion to understand Dhamma in its "full breadth and profundity." In doing so, we must examine Dhamma in all its metaphysical/cosmological complexity.