Notes on Buddhist Ethics, Day one

Day one is about introductions and orientation. The students will have read much of Walpola Rahula's excellent book, "What the Buddha Taught." So they won't be in the dark about Buddhist concepts, but "Buddhist Ethics" will still be something new to them.

We'll begin with me, my background as a student of philosophy and Buddhist Studies; I could crack a joke about studying PS and BS, but I have a feeling I'd be the only one laughing. As such, I'm most interested in ideas (and hence texts). But I also see the importance of looking at what people actually do. So while we look at and examine texts, we should ask what contextual factors influenced these ideas and how the ideas were put into practice, if indeed they ever were.

I'm also a practitioner of Buddhism - having practiced in many traditions and never formally setting roots in any.  That said, I'm mostly familiar with practices and texts of the Theravadin tradition.

Now for some Buddhist Ethics. What is it? Where do we find it?

Ethics might be:

• a set of principles of right conduct, or
• a theory or system of moral values.

Ethics also is:

• The study of the general nature of morals and of the specific moral choices to be made by a person; moral philosophy, and
• The rules or standards governing the conduct of a person or the members of a profession: e.g. medical ethics.

What we are doing here is the third one, and what we'll look at are the first two.

"Buddhism" is sometimes hard to pin down too. But as students or scholars, the usual convention is to start with the historical person, Siddhartha Gautama, the body of teachings attributed to him, and the community that formed around him in his lifetime and after.  These are known to Buddhists as the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha; the three jewels, or the three refuges.

Because the tradition is so old, with the Buddha living approximately from 483-403 BCE, there have been countless historical developments in "Buddhism." Today we might wish to highlight the many different "Buddhisms" by pointing out the differences between Tibetan Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, and Thai Buddhism, or between Sakya Tibetan Buddhism and Geluk Tibetan Buddhism, and so on. There are divisions, and divisions within divisions, so that we have to be careful not to think we ever know all of "Buddhism" - even when we know the early texts or the teachings of this or that great master very well.

On the other hand, it cannot be the case that "anything goes" in our definition of Buddhism. If a Westerner picks up and enjoys a book on Buddhism and begins to identify him/herself as a Buddhist, we might wonder: does this person take refuge in the 3 jewels? Does this person believe that good actions bring good rewards and bad actions lead to bad consequences? Does this person practice generosity with the understanding of no-self and/or interconnectedness?

It helps to keep in mind that "Buddhism" itself is a Western term, created by Europeans as they colonized India. There, people who identified themselves as followers of Ganesh or Shiva were lumped into the soup of Hinduism, while those who followed Buddha and Jina Mahavira were deemed different enough (as followers of human teachers rather than deities/gods) to get their own categories as Buddhists and Jains.  

For our purposes, we'll stick pretty closely to the core texts. Keeping in mind what is covered in "What the Buddha Taught" we'll look at Peter Harvey's excellent, "Introduction to Buddhist Ethics." This book also traces out the contours of the early texts, and then moves us into some of the changes brought about in Mahayana Buddhism. Here we'll explore the concept of Upaya (or "skillful means") along with such developments as Tantra, Pure Land, Zen and Nichiren Buddhism.

Buddhism and Ecology - Dr. Brook Ziporyn

(from the video page):

A leading scholar in Tiantai (Tendai) Buddhism will clarify the true nature of reality in relation to environmental concerns and the relevance of Buddhist practice for today.

Lecturer: Dr. Brook Ziporyn
Associate Professor, Department of Religion, Northwestern University

He specializes in Chinese Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism. He earned the Ph. D in Chinese philosophy at the University of Michigan and has taught Buddhism and Chinese thought at the University of Michigan, Harvard University, the Chung-hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies,Taiwan, and Northwestern University (since 1998).

An interesting journey through both Theravadin and Mahayana sources for a Buddhist Ecology, as well as the difficulties with such a concept (there is no Buddhist word for ecology, for instance). Each of the stories he tells should be ready at hand for students of Buddhism interested in dealing with our ecological crises. Highly recommended.

The structure of the Dharma

I just came across a good quote worth sharing as I journey through phd-thesis-land:

"It seems clear to me that the Buddha would not have been averse to later doctrinal innovation if it occurred within the fundamental structure of the Dharma, that is, if it was of spiritual benefit on the path to nirvāṇa." - 1989 version of his Mahāyāna Buddhism, pp.11-12.

This comes just after another quote worth copying in full - but I'm too lazy at the moment so lets just hope this link works for everyone.

The gist is, I think, in line with what many people argue about Buddhism, that it is anti-essentialist and thus, in a sense, hard to pin down. It does however set a criteria for change: that those changes are helpful/useful. If a doctrine no longer helps, it is to be discarded. Vigorous debate and analysis would thus seem to be encouraged, so that each new generation of students learned for themselves and understood for themselves the truth of things - rather than ever relying on teachings alone.

'Tis worth noting something else Paul writes (on p.3) regarding anti-essentialism in Buddhism [directly in regard to the essentialist fallacy of trying to lump all of Mahāyāna under certain sweeping labels]:

"An ability to look behind unities and see them as merely words, convenient but misleading linguistic constructs, has always formed an important factor in developing insight meditation, the spiritual cultivation which alone will lead to seeing things as they really are, the sine qua non of nirvāṇa, enlightenment, the cessation of moral obscurations and ignorance."

The lesson? While there is no absolute right and wrong out there for us to grasp onto, there are right and wrong (kusala/akusala) moments and ideas for us. Things that are not helpful, not morally wholesome, not conducive to wisdom --- these are wrong. That much we definitely can say about Buddhist ethics.

But we cannot say one MUST meditate, or tithe 10%, or live in a monastery, or this or that... If we know that meditation, generosity, etc will be helpful, wholesome, and/or conducive to wisdom, either for others or ourselves - then we may say they are right and should be done.

This distinction is crucial and should be understood (there I go with my shoulds!). Our ignorant habit of clinging wishes to find an Answer out there that is right and always right and never changing. No such answer is to be found. But there are "a" answers out there, moments of truth, concepts that help, suggestions and even stern admonishments that break us away from our unhealthy habits. These are right, but they are only right in that very moment. Tomorrow they may no longer work, they may in fact be wrong then.

Who knows? Do not cling...

Filial Piety and the Sigalovaada Sutta in China

In preparation for my upcoming trip to China I'm boning up on Chinese Buddhism - an area where I am woefully ignorant.

As we know, Buddhism has changed to accommodate the particular cultures it has encountered through time. I am currently reading "The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism" by Kenneth Ch'en. In his chapter on Ethics he states that one of the greatest challenges Buddhism hit in China was the cultural propensity toward filial piety, Hsiao.

At first the Buddhists in China simply countered each claim that they were anti-hsiao, pointing to Chinese history to support the righteousness of their practices, such as shaving the head. Eventually though, a more 'positive' stance was taken, meaning that the Buddhists began reaching into their own scriptures and emphasizing those that supported filial piety. Chief among these is the Sigalovaada Sutta, which was translated numerous times by Chinese Buddhists (see p.19).

Several other texts were found as well, including Jataka tails, the lives of Saama (Pali, Shan-tzu in Chinese and Shyaama in Sanskrit) and Moggallaana (Pali, Mu-lien in Chinese and Maudgalyaayana in Sanskrit).

Only at page 50 do we move past the discussion of filial piety and on to Ancestor Worship, a closely related topic. Here we find the following:

1. There are no known notices of (Buddhist?) clerical participation in memorial services prior to the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 C.E.).
2. The first likely occurred in 628 CE.
3. The Chinese Buddhists subscribed to the same post-mortem description as the Tibetans; (the Sarvastivadin, I believe) wherein the 'soul' enteres an intermediate state where it may remain for seven days or seven times seven / 49 days. Buddhists in China turned the Confucian idea of memorials to celebrate gratitude for the departed into necessary merit-generating events to get the 'soul' of the dead to a good location.

Page 55 begins the discussion of the 5 precepts and the Chinese Buddhist attempt to harmonise these with the 5 Norms of Confucian thought:

1. human-heartedness
2. righteousness
3. propriety
4. knowledge
5. trust

Usually the 5 precepts were paired directly with these, but in some cases the 2nd precept (not to steal) is paired with the fourth Norm (knowledge), the 3rd (not to commit adultry) is paired with the 2nd Norm (righteousness), and the 4th precept (not to lie) is paired with the 3rd Norm.

The chapter concludes that Buddhism's wide acceptance in China is demonstrably due to its flexibility and creative assimilation of the existing norms (quite literally).

The next chapter is on Politics... ohh, ahh. More on that hopefully before I fly...

Compassion: Mahayana vs Theravada

Roshi Robert Aitken (wiki) writes:

Nowhere among Mahayana practices is concern for other beings expressed more
clearly than in the metta practice of loving kindness in Theravada Buddhism. One
begins with a focus upon the self:

May I be free from danger.
May I have mental happiness.
May I have physical happiness.
May I have the ease of well-being. 8

Metta then is directed to those near and dear—may they be free from danger, and so on—then to those about whom one feels neutral, then to enemies, and so on to all beings. Under the guidance of a seasoned teacher, the resistance one feels to this compassionate practice is faced squarely and allowed to wither and disappear.

"Formal Practice: Buddhist or Christian" - Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002)

8) Sharon Salsberg, Loving Kindness: The Revolutionary Art of Happiness (Boston: Sham-
bhala, 1995), p. 32.

Notes on Masao Abe's 1983 paper "God, Emptiness, and Ethics"

Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 3. (1983), pp. 53-60.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.orgsici?sici=0882-0945%281983%293%3C53%3AGEAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

1: key people:

• Masao Abe: Japanese Pure Land practitioner in Kyoto School
  
• Malcolm David Eckel: American, Boston U, philosopher / comparative relig.
  
• Robert Thurman: American scholar of (primarily) Tibetan Buddhism
  
• George E. Rupp: American educator and theologian
  
• John Cobb Jr.: Process philosopher, Christian, social activist
• - T.R.V. Murti: Indian Philosopher who wrote the "Central Philosophy of Buddhism..." which was too heavily filled with his own ideas to be a trustworthy source of knowledge of early Buddhism.
  

2: key themes:

• Ultimate reality - ontology - metaphysics
• Epistemology
• Soteriology
• Ethics
• Eschatology
• Two Truths, Samsara/Nirvana (n.b. this discussion shows the complexity of this doctrine in a way that is parallel to that of Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction. Each has both ontological and epistemic import throughout, and each has been misunderstood as applying to only one of these realms)
  
• Buddhist-Christian Dialogue
• kataphatic / apophatic (via-negativa)
  

3: argument:

Christian ethics are Eschatological, pointing to an end-time (judgment, coming of God, etc) and therefore temporal and historically oriented. "Buddhist ethics and its dynamism are
based on this dialectical tension of 'already' and 'not yet', a tension which is not future-oriented but absolute-present-oriented. Thus, in Buddhism, at each and every moment of history, a development toward the endless future is at once the total return to the root and source of history, that is, unchanging eternity." (p.60)

Rupp and Cobb, as per Thurman's criticism, misunderstand this ahistoricity as implying a certain death (or lack) of ethics.

Notable Quotes:

Thurman also emphasizes the inseparability of the insight of Emptiness from
ethical action and the interdependency of metaphysics and ethics in Buddhism. (p.54)

... Murti overlooks the discontinuity between samsara and Nirvana. In Bud-
dhism, samsara is realized as the beginningless and endless process of living-
dying. There is no continuous path from samsara to Nirvana; (p.54)

Buddha thus showed the way to attain Nirvana by realizing the dependent co-
origination of everything in the process of samsara. (p.56)

In order to make this point clearer, let me quote a well known discourse of a
Chinese Zen master, Ch'ing-yuan Wei-hsin of the T'ang dynasty. It runs as
follows:
Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen I said, 'Mountains are
mountains; waters are waters.' After I got an insight into the truth of Zen
through the instruction of a good master, I said, 'Mountains are not moun-
tains; waters are not waters.' But now, having attained the abode of final rest
(that is enlightenment), I say, 'Mountains are really mountains; waters are
really waters. ' (p.56)

Along the lines of Wei-hsin, we can state with full justification:
Before Buddhist practice, I thought 'good is good, evil is evil.' When I had
an insight into Buddhist truth, I realized 'good is not good, evil is not evil.'
But now, awakening to true Emptiness I say, 'good is really good; evil is
really evil.' (p.57)

As both Eckel and Thurman emphasize, Buddhist Emptiness is not merely
an ontological ultimate reality devoid of practical commitment. (p.57)

As I suggested before, ethics belongs to conventional truth. However, true
and genuine ethics may be in the mundane world, it cannot arrive at ultimate
truth as Emptiness. There is no continuous path from ethics to Emptiness. In
order to reach Emptiness ethics must be realized as "ignorance" and be turned
over completely. However, this is only the negative aspect of Emptiness. In its
positive and affirmative aspect, in which Emptiness empties itself, ultimate
truth expresses itself in the form of ethics and ethics is thereby reestablished in
light of Emptiness.

Accordingly, although ethics belongs to the conventional realm, it is not
subordinate to the realization of Emptiness, for ultimate truth can express itself
only in the mundane world. In this sense Emptiness may even be said to be
subordinate to ethics. In Madhyama-kakarika,Nagarjuna says, "The ultimate
truth is not taught apart from practical beha~ior."~ In Nagarjuna the ontologi-
cal realization of Emptiness is always connected with practical and soteriological
concerns. (p.58)

When Nirvana is simply taken as the goal, ethics may be dissolved in Emptiness and history may not be clearly realized. This is why throughout its long history Mahayana Buddhism has emphasized "Do not abide in Nirvana" and severely rejected an attachment to Emptiness as a "rigid view of nothingness' ' or a "literal understanding of negativity." (p.59)

Cobb says, "In the Bible, Yahweh is portrayed as righteous, and the appropriate response to Yahweh's righteousness is human righteousness." Due to the transcendent character of this divine righteousness, if I am not wrong, Christian ethics becomes an eschatological ethics which is somewhat future-oriented. (p.59)

Categorizing people/work

D. Keown (1992) opens his work with a great review of past writings in Buddhist Ethics. Some of that effort will have to be replicated in my own and should be sketched out here.

Keown himself: (p.1) "In the face of the complexity of Buddhist metaphysics it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Buddhism is a response to what is fundamentally an ethical problem - the perennial problem of the best kind of life for man to lead."

N.B. Keown clearly sets the stage with this sentence. In fact, if you agree with this it is very easy to follow Keown down the path to an Aristotelian interpretation of Buddhist Ethics. However, one must then ask what to do with all that darned metaphysics. Other thinkers, myself included, will find metaphysical issues central to Buddhist Ethics (not a red herring as Keown suggests, cf. p19)

p. 4 "Previous Research"

Most has been descriptive (not normative or metaethical).

Tachibana (1926) "So far as I know, no work is specifically devoted to this single subject" i.e. ethics in Buddhism.

Saddhatissa (1970, Buddhist Ethics)... Keown comments favorably.

Poussin (1927, La Morale Bouddhique) - based on the Abhidharmakośa, a record of debates; its as close as the tradition gets "to the discipline of moral philosophy."

~

(p.5)
Roderick Hindery (1978, Comparative Ethics in Hindu and Buddhist Traditions) "a 'lacuna' or 'perhaps a total gap' in the contemporary analysis of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics (p.223)."

G.S.P. Misra (1984, Development of Buddhist Ethics); included work on psychology (Abhidharma) - ch.3; morality of the bodhisattva (ch.5); and transcendence of ethics in Tantra (ch.6).

~
more to come...